Hi! I am a PhD candidate in the Department of Philosophy at Syracuse University. I work on free will, interested in both the metaphysical and ethical questions surrounding it. Before coming to Syracuse, I earned my BA in Philosophy and Cognitive Science from the University of Toronto.
I was born and (partly) raised in South Korea. The name in brackets is my Korean name. I publish under Chris Cho.
Can manipulated agents be morally responsible for what they do? Many find the claim that they can philosophically scandalous. In this dissertation, I argue otherwise. As a structuralist, I hold that an agent's moral responsibility is determined solely by their psychological or agential structure at the time of action. And as a hard-liner, I hold that manipulated agents are morally responsible because they satisfy certain structural conditions compatibilists find sufficient for moral responsibility. I therefore defend what I call hard-line structuralism.
Forthcoming · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Can manipulated agents be morally responsible for what they do? According to hard-line structuralism, yes. On this view, manipulated agents are responsible in virtue of satisfying the relevant structural conditions taken to be sufficient for responsibility. Historicists disagree, claiming that responsibility also has a historical dimension. Here, I offer a two-step defense of hard-line structuralism. The first is deflationary: I argue that the kind of manipulation that best serves the historicists entails certain structural properties that already meet the normative demands historicists invoke to justify historical conditions. The second is debunking: I argue that our reluctance to attribute responsibility to manipulated agents stems from an anchoring bias toward their pre-manipulation psychology, a bias that lacks normative justification.
Many find it plausible that acting freely requires a kind of sensitivity to reasons. Modalists define this sensitivity in terms of what S does in the relevant alternative possibilities. Agent modalists take S to be an agent, assessing their reasons-sensitivity by considering what the agent would have done in those possibilities. While intuitive, agent modalists struggle with Frankfurt cases. This has led some to a mechanism-based approach. Here, I raise two objections to this approach and defend agent modalism. I argue that (1) the mechanism approach permits composite mechanisms, leading to an unattractive disjunction, and (2) excluding the agent undermines the original appeal of reasons-sensitivity. I defend agent modalism by arguing it can handle Frankfurt cases if it holds fixed the nonoccurrence of agent-altering events. This requirement also helps address rational blind spots. Thus, I aim to rehabilitate agent modalism as a viable account of reasons-sensitivity in free action.
Works in Progress
A paper on manipulation argumentsUnder review
A paper about modalist reasons-sensitivityDraft available
A paper about Frankfurt-style omission casesUnder review
A paper about structuralismUnder review
Presentations
"Towards Agent Modalist Reasons-Sensitivity"Eastern APA (Poster) · January 2026
"Manipulation and Hard-line Structuralism"Working Papers, Syracuse University · April 2025
"Towards Agent Modalist Reasons-Sensitivity"Free Will and Agency Conference, Florida State University · October 2024
"Responding to Cyr: A Defense of Historicism"Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Iowa · April 2024
"Is there a duty to adopt? Evaluating the Assistance Argument"SPEL Conference, Binghamton University · November 2023
Teaching
I am a dedicated teacher who believes that philosophy, done well, should be fun, engaging, and accessible. I strive to create a classroom environment where students feel comfortable wrestling with difficult ideas, and where abstract philosophical questions are brought to life through concrete examples and open discussion.
A full record of my teaching experience is listed below. My teaching portfolio is available here.
As Primary Instructor
Introduction to Moral Theory
Syracuse University · Spring 2026
Theories of Knowledge and Reality
Syracuse University · Fall 2025, Summer 2025
As Teaching Assistant
Critical Thinking
Syracuse University · Spring 2025 · for Josh Hunt
Human Nature
Syracuse University · Fall 2024 · for Pam Ryan
Logic
Syracuse University · Spring 2024 · for Michael Rieppel
Theories of Knowledge and Reality
Syracuse University · Fall 2023 · for Robert van Gulick
Logic
Syracuse University · Spring 2023 · for Mark Heller
